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Commentary
CHOICES AND COMMITMENTS FOR
WOMEN: CHALLENGING THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN
THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL
ASSISTANCE©
BY MARY JANE

MOSSMAN*

With increasing numbers of sequential marriages [and other intimate adult relationships],
solutions to the financial crisis of [family] breakdown must be sought not only within the
parameters of family law but also in social and economic policies that promote the financial
viability of all persons in need, including the economic victims of [family] breakdown. The
war on the feminization of poverty must be won by innovative and coherent socioeconomic
policies....'

Julien Payne's comment illustrates the need to rethink relationships
between "public" policies about the economic security of "private" families
and individuals in Canada. In addressing this theme, Susan Boyd and Claire
Young identify important connections in recent developments in tax and
family law concerning the economic security of individuals in Canadian
society.2 As they demonstrate, tax law principles are often "hidden" but
nonetheless important elements of our fiscal and social policies; and family
law principles have consequences that extend well beyond individual
parties, affecting other family members, communities, and governmental
resources. By linking recent developments in tax and family law, they
clearly demonstrate a need to reassess public policies about economic
responsibilities, and to rethink traditional relationships between families
and the state.

M.J. Mossman, 2005.
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Professor Mossman teaches courses in
Property and Family Law. Her scholarship includes issues of gender equality and access to justice,
including social assistance.
I Julien D. Payne, "Family Law in Canada" in Maureen Baker, ed.,
Canada'sChangingFamilies:
Challenges to Public Policy (Ottawa: Vanier Institute of the Family, 1994) 13 at 27.
2 Susan B. Boyd
& Claire F.L. Young, "Feminism, Law, and Public Policy: Family
Feuds and
Taxing Times" (2005) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 545.
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Boyd and Young identify several themes in their analysis of
relationships between tax and family law policies, including the impact of
privatization and the shifting terrain within which feminist litigation and
activism have intersected with claims under the CanadianCharterof Rights
andFreedoms3 during the past two decades. In this context, they identify the
persistent gap between law "on the books" and its impact on women's lives,
particularly the ways in which the construction of the liberal individual so
often fails to take account of "real life" for many women. It seems
significant that several recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada,
on a variety of family law issues, have used ideas about individual "choice"
as a fundamental principle.4 This brief comment explores this idea of choice
in some recent family law decisions as a way of examining ongoing tensions
about the roles of families and the state with respect to responsibilities for
economic dependency.
As Boyd's analysis demonstrates, earlier Supreme Court decisions
in Moge v. Moge,5 Bracklow v. Bracklow,6 and M. v. H. consistently
expanded the scope of familialresponsibility for spousal support at the end
of a relationship. In Moge, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the
"feminization of poverty" and recognized that a former spouse had an
obligation to provide support to a dependent spouse to compensate for
disadvantages experienced during the marriage and at marriage
breakdown. 8 In Bracklow, the court decided that a former spouse could
base an application for ongoing support on financial need per se. 9 As I have
argued in relation to these cases, the Court clearly recognized economic
need on the part of former spouses (mostly women), but the decisions also
conflated this need with an assertion that the obligation to respond to it
belonged entirely to (former) family members, not to the state.' 0 As a
3 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11
[Charter].
4 Feminist analysis has frequently articulated ideas of "choice" as well. Significantly,
however, the
Supreme Court's principles generally reflect a more traditional idea of choice. For a recent analysis, see
Diana Majury, "The Charter,Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration" (2002) 40
Osgoode Hall L.J. 297 at 316-20.
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 [Moge].
6 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 [Bracklow].
7

M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R.
3.
8 Supra note 5 at 842.
9 Supra note 6 at
10

448.
Mary Jane Mossman, "Conversations about Families in Canadian Courts and Legislatures: Are

there 'Lessons' for the United States?" (2003) 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 171 at 186.
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result, in cases where a former spouse has little or no financial means to
provide such support, recognition of a familial obligation will not provide
much, if any, economic security." In this context, the extension of spousal
support obligations to same-sex couples in M v. H., which confirmed legal
recognition for such relationships, simultaneously imposed new familial
obligations for economic dependency on partners in these relationships as
well.12 Moreover, when these cases about spousal support are linked to the
13 in which the Court
Supreme Court's decision in Chartier v. Chartier,
concluded that a stepfather in a short term relationship acquired ongoing
child support obligations for his partner's biological child, the Court's
preference for widening the 14scope for familial, rather than state, support
for dependency is apparent.
As noted by Boyd and Young, such decisions create dilemmas for
feminist policy analysts. While these cases appear to accept feminist
analyses of the economic disadvantages that flow from the division of
household labour (at least in heterosexual relationships, and particularly in
terms of child care), and feminist critiques about how these factors
contribute to poverty for women and children at separation or divorce, the
decisions fail to recognize that separating spouses often have resources that
are inadequate to maintain two households above the poverty level. 5 In
such a context, although federal legislation makes divorce highly accessible,
governmental policies offer little or no financial assistance for post-divorce
families; in this way, the problem of economic support for post-divorce
families remains a private matter. Similarly, governmental policies
concerning child support have aspired to identify precise guidelines for
parental obligations and to enforce payment more effectively. The
appropriateness of such policies has been lauded by media reports about
high-income fathers (especially lawyers and sports figures) who have been
compelled by courts to support their children at the end of a marriage or
cohabiting relationship. Yet these same principles may wreak hardship on
poor men who are much less often featured in discussions of public policies

11

Ibid.

12 Supra note 7.
13

[1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 [Chartier].
14 See also Monkman v. Beaulieu (2000), 149 Man. R. (2d) 295.
15 For a longitudinal analysis of the economic circumstances of men and women at separation, see
Ross Finnie, "Women, Men, and the Economic Consequences of Divorce: Evidence from Canadian
Longitudinal Data" (1993) 30 Can. Rev. of Soc. & Anthr. 205; for a critique of the models, see Margrit
Eichler, "The Limits of Family Law Reform or, the Privatization of Female and Child Poverty" (199091) 7 Can. Fam. L.Q. 59.
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concerning "post-divorce family units,' 16 and feminist concerns about the
need for both family and state support for economic dependency have not
received similar media coverage. In effect, both legislative policies and
judicial decisions have accepted feminist analyses of the need for economic
support post-divorce, but they have not reflected feminist ideas about state
support for families (in relation to both intact and disintegrating family
units); instead, there has been a privatization of responsibilities for
economic dependency through legal recognition of "post-divorce family
units."' 7
However, feminist analysis of public policy concerning dependency
must now take account of a number of recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada that appear to limit support obligations for former family
members. In three recent cases, the Court adopted ideas about preserving
opportunities for individual choices on the part of spouses. This approach
resulted in rejection of a cohabiting woman's right to share equally in
accumulated family property at the end of a relationship and rejection of
claims about unfairness for women who signed family contracts, including
a separation agreement and a marriage contract. In all three cases, the legal
principles limited rights to women's share of property or entitlement to
additional property or spousal support. For example, in Nova Scotia v.
Walsh,'8 the Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the provincial
government from a unanimous Court of Appeal decision, rejecting the
cohabiting woman's claim that her exclusion from the statutory propertysharing regime constituted an infringement of her section 15 Charter
equality right. In doing so, Justice Bastarache (for a majority of eight,
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 dissenting) acknowledged that "unmarried
spouses have suffered from historical disadvantage and stereotyping," but
asserted that it was necessary to recognize that some "opposite sex
individuals in conjugal relationships of some permanence, have chosen to
avoid the institution of marriage and the legal consequences that flow from
it.""9 Thus, he held that "[t]o ignore these differences among cohabiting
couples presumes a commonality of intention and understanding that
16 Mary Jane Mossman, "Child Support or Support for Children? Re-Thinking 'Public' and
'Private' in Family Law" (1997) 46 U.N.B.L.J. 63; Sherri Torjman, "Crests and Crashes: The Changing
Tides of Family Income Security" in Baker, supra note 1, 69; and Susan B. Boyd, "Challenging the
Public/Private Divide: An Overview" in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/PrivateDivide:
Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 1.
17 The concept of the "post-divorce family unit" appeared in Thibaudeau v. Canada,
[1995] 2
S.C.R. 627; see also Mossman, supra note 10.
18 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 [Walsh].
19 Ibid. at 355.
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simply does not exist. This effectively nullifies the individual's freedom to
choose alternative family20 forms and to have that choice respected and
legitimated by the state.,

Similarly, in Miglin v. Miglin,2 l the Supreme Court allowed an
appeal from the Ontario Court of Appeal, with the majority (Justices
Deschamps and Lebel dissenting) concluding that choices reflected in
private agreements between divorcing spouses should be respected,
particularly where both spouses were represented by counsel in their
22 the Supreme Court allowed
negotiations. And inHartshomev. Hartshorne,
an appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal in relation to the
terms of a marriage contract. The majority (Justices Binnie, Deschamps,
and Lebel dissenting in part) found that the wife had received legal advice
that the marriage contract was unconscionable and unfair, but that she had
"chosen" to sign it. It was held that her choice should be binding, especially
since both spouses were lawyers and thus deemed to understand the nature
of such contracts.
By contrast with the majority judgments, the dissenting judges in all
three cases pointed to the complexity of ideas of "choice" in marriage and
cohabiting relationships. In addition to problems of inequality in bargaining
power, well-documented in feminist analyses of family negotiations,23 ideas
about choice in intimate relationships are often complicated by family
loyalties, economic dependency (especially if children are involved), and a
lack of viable alternatives. For example, in relation to the choice to cohabit,
rather than marry, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 stated in Walsh:
[T]he choice not to marry is not a matter belonging to each individual alone. The ability to
marry is inhibited whenever one of the two partners wishes to marry and the other does not.
In this situation, it can hardly be said that the person who wishes to marry but must cohabit
in order to obey the wishes of his or her partner chooses to cohabit. This results in a situation
where one of the parties to the cohabitation relationship preserves his or her autonomy at
the expense of the other .... Under these circumstances, stating that both members
of the
24
relationship chose to avoid the legal consequences of marriage is patently absurd.

Similarly, the protracted negotiations detailed in the lower court
judgments in both Miglin and Hartshornesuggest that there were important
20 Ibi. at 356.
21 [20031
1 S.C.R. 303 [Miglin].

22 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 22 [Hartshorne].
23 See Marcia Neave, "Resolving the Dilemma of Difference: A Critique of'The Role of Private
Ordering in Family Law' (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 97; Diana Majury, "Unconscionability in an Equality Law
Context" (1991) 7 Can. Fam. L.Q. 123.
24 Supra note 18 at 402-03.
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constraints on the "real life" choices available to the women who signed
these agreements." These factors were generally ignored in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the legal principles.
Beyond the facts and legal principles, these three decisions
complicate the terrain of feminism and public policy in significant ways. For
example, they seem to signal the Court's response to concerns about the
emphasis on familial support for dependency post-divorce. Indeed, the
clear message from the two contract cases is that the Court will not
generally intervene if the parties have negotiated a private agreement,
particularly if they have received independent legal advice. To the extent
that the media publicized the complaints of payor spouses about their
continuing responsibilities for former spouses (usually wives), these cases
signal the solution: private agreements. In imposing limits on a former
spouse's ability to overturn an agreement, whether a marriage contract or
a separation agreement, even if it is "unfair," it seems likely that there will
be more agreements and fewer opportunities to review them. In this way,
the cases appear consistent with the earlier principles concerning the
privatization of family law.
At the same time, however, these principles about choice also limit
private family responsibilities. The Supreme Court's analysis never
addresses whether this gap will be filled by the state. In part, the Court's
failure to address this gap results from the fact that neither Ms. Miglin nor
Ms. Hartshorne needed to apply for social assistance, at least not
immediately. The Court thus defined family law principles in a context of
parties with relatively greater wealth than may be enjoyed by many
separating spouses. Interestingly, Ms. Walsh's situation appeared more
vulnerable after the Supreme Court rejected her claim to equal sharing of
family property (albeit allowing her to make an application for a
declaration of trust). Yet, significantly, Ms. Walsh and Mr. Bona reached
a settlement prior to the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: she
received one-half of the property on the strength of the unanimous decision
of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in her favour.26 The outcome in Walsh
may demonstrate the importance of assessing "real life" bargaining power
in the negotiation of family agreements, a factor that was arguably all too
absent from the majority decisions of the Supreme Court in Miglin and
Hartshorne.

2S See Miglin v. Miglin (1999), 3 R.F.L. (5th) 106 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Hartshome v. Hartshorne,
[1999] B.C.J. No. 2861 (S.C.) (QL).
26 See D). A. Rollie Thompson, N/ova Scotia v. Walsh, Annotation (2002), 32 R.F.L. (5th) 81.

2004]

Choices and Commitments for Women

What is crucially missing in all three cases is any sense of how a
spouse who is not entitled to familial support, but who is not otherwise
economically "independent," is supposed to function in Canadian society.
The shift from familial responsibility for the "post-divorce family unit" to
individual choice and responsibility may not work in real life for (too) many
Canadians. Moreover, as Young explains, although these cases are
characterized as matters of family law, the issues about familial and state
responsibilities for dependency clearly invoke important issues of fiscal
policy. For me, issues about the intersection of family and fiscal policies are
most contested in the context of social assistance. 27 For example, the
Supreme Court of Canada rendered a decision about social assistance in
Gosselin,28 an appeal from Quebec in 2002 in which the Court was quite
divided: a bare majority of five justices upheld a Quebec statute which
prescribed a lower level of social assistance benefits for persons under the
age of thirty unless they participated in job training schemes. For the
majority of the Court, the ameliorative purpose of creating incentives for
young persons in receipt of social assistance to participate in such
educational programmes removed any possibility of a challenge under the
section 15 equality guarantee of the Charter; applicants could choose to
participate in the programmes and thus obtain a higher level of benefits.
Significantly, however, the majority also concluded that the government's
failure to provide sufficient places for all recipients under thirty, which
consigned the applicant to living in poverty, did not contravene the
provisions of section 7.29
Four justices dissented. One of the dissenters, Justice Bastarache,
suggested that the government's assumption, in enacting this differential
level of benefits for recipients under thirty, was that they would receive
assistance, particularly in relation to housing, from their parents.3"
Unfortunately, this assumption was untrue for Ms. Gosselin, so that she was
forced to live on an amount of social assistance that was less than the
27 For recent analyses of these issues, see also Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, "Beyond the Social
and Economic Rights Debate: Substantive Equality Speaks to Poverty" (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 185; Martha
T. McCluskey, "Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare
State" (2003) 78 Ind. L.J. 783.
28 Gosselin v. Quebec (2002), 221 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (S.C.C.) [Gosselin].
29 The decision in Gosselin has been criticized by a number of commentators. See e.g. Jamie
Cameron, "Positive Obligations under Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment on Gosselin v.
Quebec" (2003) 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 65; Nathasha Kim & Tina Piper, "Gosselin v. Quebec: Back to
the Poorhouse..." (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 749; and David Matas, "Gosselin v. Quebec: Is Starvation
Illegal? The Enforceability of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living" (2003) 4 Melbourne J. Int'l
L. 217.
30 Gosselin, supra note 28 at 360-61 [emphasis added].
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defined basic survival amount in Quebec. It is clear that the normative
assumption of this social assistance legislation was the existence offamilial,
not governmental, support for dependency. As a result, Gosselin appeared
to reach a different conclusion than the three recent family law decisions
about responsibility for economic dependency: while the family law cases
stressed choice and private decision making to limit ongoing familial
support, the majority in Gosselin limited state support for economic
dependency, apparently assuming the availability of familial support. Does
the result in Gosselin mean that social assistance recipients (and other
Canadians who are poor) are less entitled to choice and private decision
making?
The Supreme Court's decision to grant leave to appeal in Falkiner
v. Ontario represented an opportunity to test this thesis. Although the
applicants in this case were unsuccessful in their Charterclaims at the initial
tribunal hearing, both the Divisional Court and the Ontario Court of
Appeal 3' rendered strong decisions confirming the right of these social
assistance mothers to make "choices" to ensure the economic viability of
their families. Their challenges had been launched following governmental
changes to the definition of "spouse in the house" in Ontario in 1995, so as
to include single mothers living with male persons with whom they shared
expenses.32 The applicants were all single mothers who were living with men
who were not the biological fathers of their children, and they all had
arrangements for sharing some of the costs of rent, food, and other
household expenses. They argued that, pursuant to Ontario law, none of
these male cohabitees had responsibility to support the mothers or (at least
at that time) their children. Significantly, some of the women had
previously been in abusive relationships, and although they were hoping
that these new relationships would become permanent, they all "chose" to
test the relationships for a time, while maintaining financial independence
from their male partners. Although the new definition of "spouse" in 1995
required that all of these relationships be characterized as "familial," thus
denying entitlement to social assistance for these single mothers, the
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Divisional Court,
confirming that the new definition contravened the equality guarantee in
section 15 of the Charter:
Beyond purely financial concerns, more fundamental dignity interests of the [applicants]
have been affected. Being reclassified as a spouse forces the [applicants] and other single
mothers in similar circumstances to give up either their financial independence or their

31(2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.) [Falkiner].
32 See R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 366, as am. by 0. Reg. 409/95; see also 0. Reg. 134/98.

2004]

Choices and Commitments for Women
relationship... .Forcing them to becomefinanciallydependent on men with whom they have, at
best, try-on relationshipsstrikes at the core of their human dignity.33

Falkinerclearly established that the state, rather than the "family,"
had primary responsibility for the financial dependency of these single
mothers and their children. In addition, the Ontario Court of Appeal's
decision appeared to recognize an opportunity for choice on the part of
single mothers on social assistance, at least for the three-year period prior
to the creation of legal obligations pursuant to the Family Law Act.34 Thus,
Falkiner recognized the appropriateness of state, rather than family,
support while it also confirmed some scope for choice on the part of social
assistance recipients, a significant achievement.
Interestingly, the Ontario Court of Appeal's approach in Falkiner
appeared consistent with the Supreme Court's approach in the three recent
family law decisions: the encouragement of private agreements, the scope
for exercising "choice," and a recognition of limits on "private" familial
responsibility for economic dependency. At the same time, however,
Falkiner appeared rather inconsistent with the decision in Gosselin: the
"choices" of the social assistance recipients in Falkiner clearly increased
levels of public spending, so that the case directly confronted the
privatization agenda that appeared significant in Gosselin.3 5 Moreover, in
contrast with Ms. Miglin and Ms. Hartshorne, whose lack of entitlement to
familial support did not require state assistance, the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision in Falkinerclearly recognized opportunities for choice for
women, even when their choices created a need for economic support on
the part of the state. In this way, the Falkinerappeal appeared to stand at
the intersection of family law and fiscal policy, challenging the Supreme
Court to confirm, in the social assistance context, the efficacy of its
principles of choice and private decision making in relation to agreements
limiting familial responsibility for dependency.
Significantly, the Falkinerchallenge remains unresolved because the
Ontario government withdrew its appeal in September 2004.36 As a result,
the questions of public policy embedded in Falkineralso remain unresolved:
33

Falkiner,supra note 31 at 512 [emphasis added]. See also Dorothy E. Chunn & Shelley
A.M.
Gavigan, "Welfare Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the 'Never Deserving' Poor"
(2004) 13 Soc. & Legal Stud. 219; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, "A Geneology of 'Dependency':
Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State" in Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus:CriticalReflections
on the "Postsocialist"Condition (New York & London: Routledge, 1997) 121.
R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, ss. 29-30.
35 See also Majury, supra note 4 at 335-36.
36 Notice of discontinuance filed 1 September 2004. See [204] S.C.C.B. at 1330; see also 0. Reg.
197/02.
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are the Supreme Court's messages about the significance of choice and
private decision making intended only for relatively wealthy families, or do
they also apply in "real life" for other Canadians, including social assistance
recipients? Although the Falkinercase will not be heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada, it seems clear that the Court's principles about respecting
private family choices will still have to be confronted at some point within
the most contested terrain for Canadian fiscal and family policy: social
assistance.

